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After Rashi wrote his commentary on the Torah, most Torah scholars no longer learned the written Torah without reference to Rashi’s work. His commentary became indispensable, and virtually no-one wrote another commentary that failed to take Rashi into account. Later commentaries may have either agreed or dis-agreed with Rashi, but they seldom ignored him. It is therefore interesting that in the two weekly sections that Yakov appears most prominently (Vayeitzei and Vayishlach), Rashi says nothing about a theme that most other commentaries find challenging. Many of the commentaries on the Torah attempt to answer the question of how Yakov our forefather could marry two sisters (actually four, if Bilhah and Zilpa, who were from the same father but a different mother, are taken into account). Since the forefathers (and mothers) kept the entire Torah even before it was given, how could Yakov have married more than one sister, when that is a prohibition written in the Torah? Since Rashi’s task was to explain the simple level (pshat) of the Torah, it seems that his failure to comment in this case meant that there was nothing to explain, at least not from the perspective of the five-year old learning the Torah for the first time. But, that is strange, because the question that arises is the kind of question that a five-year may ask…
One answer that is suggested is that of the Ramban (Nachmanides, Spain and Italy in the 1100’s). He suggests that the forefathers kept the Torah only when they were in Israel. But, when they were out of Israel, as Yakov happened to be in the house of Lavan, then they did not keep the entire Torah. Thus, Yakov was permitted to marry two sisters, because at the time, he was not in Israel.
However, this answer does not work for Rashi. For, according to Rashi (in his second comment on Vayishlach), Yakov kept the Torah even outside of Israel. As Rashi explained (Gen. 32:5), “With Lavan I lived, and [even there], I kept six hundred and thirteen mitzvoth.”
Another possible answer (from the Parshat Derachim) is that even though there was a prohibition, nevertheless in a situation where there was a specific positive command from Above from a prophet or one with ruach hakodesh (“holy spirit”), the command overrides the Torah prohibition (at that particular moment in time – not forever). And in Yakov’s case, there was a command from his mother, Rivka, who was a prophetess, to go to Lavan’s house to find himself a wife. However, we do not find that there was a command to take more than one wife, and specifically, nowhere does it say that after marrying Leah, Yakov was commanded to marry the other three sisters as well.
So, we are forced to continue the search for an answer to our question of how Yakov could marry several sisters at once.
There is a general investigation regarding the forefathers before the Torah was given. It is known, as above, that they kept the entire Torah. However, the question is, what status did that confer upon them? Were they considered to be a different people – the Jews, so to speak – even before the Torah was given (because they kept the Torah)? Or did they remain bnei Noah (“sons of Noach,” who are obligated in the seven Noahide commandments)? If the latter, then in essence they were no different from all the other peoples of the earth, except that they took upon themselves additional obligations by keeping the mitzvoth of the Torah.
If we say the former, that their observance of mitzvoth conferred upon the forefathers the status of “Jews” even before the Torah was given, then we have a “handy” resolution for our question. For, if the fulfillment of mitzvoth conferred upon Yakov the status of full Jewishness, then all four “sisters” must have “converted” to Judaism in order to marry him. And, if they converted, then they are considered by the Torah to be total strangers to one another. That is, the laws of conversion do not consider the converts to remain related to their biological family – and therefore the four sisters were no longer sisters (after they “converted”)! And of course, if they were no longer considered halachic sisters, they could all marry Yakov!
But, there are several drawbacks to this “resolution” that renders it invalid. First of all, no-where do we find that the forefathers (or anyone else, before the Torah was given) were considered fully Jewish. In fact, the entire concept of conversion is learned from the giving of the Torah on Mt. Sinai. At that time, all of the Jews underwent circumcision, mikveh and acceptance of the mitzvoth (plus they had to offer sacrifices) – these are the components of conversion to Judaism. Before the Torah was given, we do not find the concept of conversion. So, it is difficult to say that Yakov was permitted to marry all the sisters because they were all converts, before the Torah was given.
Second, the entire concept that “a convert is like a new-born baby” who no longer has any blood relatives, is not a concept that fits into the realm of pshat, or simple textual level of the Torah. It is a halachic concept, not a textual concept. And as such, it belongs in the realm of drosh (the second, interpretive level of the Torah). Therefore, it cannot be the explanation, according to Rashi (who deals only with the pshat in his commentary on the Torah) of why Yakov married several sisters.
And finally, blood relations are not the only reason that a man is forbidden to marry two sisters. While it is true that certain family and relatives are forbidden to marry one another, in the case of two sisters, there is an additional factor to be taken in account. And that is the natural love that two sisters generally have for one another. Two sisters, who have grown up together in the same family with the same parents and siblings, will naturally be close to each other. And this is a very good reason why they should not marry the same man; such a marriage is guaranteed to ruin the natural love that the two sisters have for one another. So, even if, as proper converts, the Torah no longer considers the two sisters to be blood relatives, nevertheless, the Torah would frown upon such a marriage because it would only cause discord between the two sisters.
So, we are back to “square one.” How was Yakov permitted to marry more than one sister?
We must operate on the assumption that the forefathers before the giving of the Torah did not have full status as Jews, even if their fulfillment of mitzvoth did earn them an additional share of love and appreciation from G-d. They were bnei Noach who took upon themselves the additional obligations of the mitzvoth of the Torah. However, there was one caveat regarding their fulfillment of mitzvoth; since the mitzvoth of the Torah were a “stringency” that they took upon themselves voluntarily, the forefathers could not fulfill mitzvoth when they came into conflict with their obligations as bnei Noach.
At that point in history, of human kind was obligated in the seven Noahide commandments. In addition, they took upon themselves certain stringencies after the flood, in which they were all obligated. For example, even though the seven Noahide commandments include a prohibition against “incest,” the bnei Noah further took upon themselves to avoid any kind of promiscuous relations (such as outside of marriage, for example). That means that even relationships that were not technically defined as incest (i.e. between family members) became forbidden. And, once the bnei Noach accepted such stringencies, even they became obligatory.
So, if a situation arose in which the forefathers wanted to fulfill a certain commandment from the Torah, yet that fulfillment came into conflict with one of the seven Noahide commandments or with one of the added stringencies that they took upon themselves, then the Torah itself required them not to fulfill that mitzvah. In other words, when the mitzvah conflicted with their Noahide obligations, then they were obligated to forego the mitzvah and fulfill their Noahide obligation.
This, for example, was the reason that Abraham did not circumcise himself before he was commanded by G-d. One of the Noahide commandments was not to shed blood – and, as Rashi explains – that means not only the blood of others, but their own blood. And since circumcision requires that one cut off a piece of himself, resulting in blood, it was forbidden to circumcise. This is an example of a mitzvah from the Torah – circumcision – that Abraham forewent in order to avoid conflict with his Noahide command not to shed blood – even his own blood. Only when the command came directly from Above to circumcise himself did Abraham actually do so, even though he was already long aware of the Torah commandment.
A similar situation existed regarding our forefather Yakov. Among the stringencies that the bnei Noah took upon themselves was not to lie and cheat one another. (This is evident in Lavan’s statement to Yakov after Yakov married Leah (Gen 29:26); ӅThis isn’t done in our place, marrying the younger sister before the olderŔ). And in his situation, after marrying Leah, Yakov had no choice but to marry Rachel (and with them the maid servants as well, in a sort of “package deal”). This is because he had already promised Rachel that he would marry her. And because Yakov had promised Rachel that he would marry her, his obligation as a ben-Noah overrode the Torah prohibition (before it was given). The obligation to avoiding “lying” to Rachel and failing to follow through on his promise compelled Yakov to marry Rachel, even in the face of the Torah prohibition against marry two sisters. Before the Torah was given, Yakov’s primary duty was to avoid “cheating” another human being. And that is why, even though Yakov kept the entire Torah, he still married two sisters. Before the Torah was given, the prohibition did not stand up to the requirement to avoid cheating and lying to another human being.
What we can learn from this is the following; we are permitted to take on stringencies in our performance of Torah and mitzvoth – but not at the expense of others. When our own performance of a particular stringency gets in the way and interferes with another person’s well-being (either physical or spiritual), them we must forgo our own stringency for the sake of the other person. Stringencies are not a requirement of the Torah; they are a personal and individual embellishment, and thus they must not be allowed to conflict with another person’s well-being.
From Likutei Sichot of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, ztz’l, vol. 5, Pp.141-149
Rabbi David Sterne, Jerusalem Connection in the old city of Jerusalem